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Equity price is cyclical and often leads the business cycle by one or two quarters. These
observations lead to the hypothesis that shocks to equity market liquidity are an independent
source of the business cycle. In this paper I construct a model to evaluate this hypothesis. The
model is easy for aggregation and for the construction of the recursive competitive equilibrium.
After calibrating the model to the US data, I ﬁnd that a negative liquidity shock in the equity
market can generate large drops in investment and output but, contrary to what one may
conjecture, the shock generates an equity price boom. This response of equity price occurs as
long as a negative liquidity shock tightens ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints on investment. Thus,
liquidity shocks to the equity market cannot be the primary driving force of the business cycle.
For equity price to fall as it typically does in a recession, a negative liquidity shock must be
accompanied or caused by other shocks that reduce the need for investment suﬃciently and
relax ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints on investment. I illustrate that a strong negative productivity
shock is a good candidate of such concurrent shocks.
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Asset prices move in the business cycle with other macro variables such as investment, output,
and employment. In recent episodes, asset prices lead the business cycle. Figures 1.1 - 1.3 depict
the time series of a broad stock price index and some macro variables in the US from 1999 to
2011, all of which are percentage deviations of the quarterly data from the trend.1 It is clear
from these graphs that stock prices ﬂuctuate in a much larger scale than other variables. In fact,
to bring the variations in the variables to roughly the same scale, I have multiplied the deviation
of investment from its trend by 2 in Figure 1.1, the deviation of GDP from its trend by 10 in
Figure 1.2, and the deviation of the bond price from its trend by 50 in Figure 1.3. It is also clear
that investment and output move very closely with stock prices while the bond price moves in
the opposite direction to stock prices. Moreover, stock prices lead the business cycle in the two
recessions that occurred in the period. In the recent recession, stock prices peaked in the third
quarter of 2007 before falling to the trough in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. Investment and output
did not peak until the second quarter of 2008 and did not reach the trough until the second
quarter of 2009. Similarly, in the 2000 recession, stock prices reached the peak and the trough
about two quarters ahead of investment and output.
Figures 1.1 - 1.3 here.
These patterns of the business cycle can be consistent with the standard view that asset
prices reﬂect expectations about the future health of the aggregate economy. It is possible that
immediately after stock prices peaked in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 and the third quarter of 2007,
asset market participants received news that the conditions of the aggregate economy would soon
deteriorate rapidly. Such expectations could drive asset prices down, and the ensuing fall in
investment and output could be just fulﬁlling the expectations. Although possible, this view is
diﬃcult to be checked with reliable evidence because prior to both recessions, there was wide
dispersion in the forecast on the future health of the economy. It is diﬃcult to believe that most
market participants in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 and the third quarter of 2007 had forecast that
the overall stock price would fall by nearly 57% in a short period of time.
1The stock price index is the Wilshire 5000 price full cap index (Wilshire Associates Incorporated, also available
at the Federal Reserve Data Center). This is an index of the market value of all stocks actively traded in the US,
weighted by market capitalization. The designation “full cap” signiﬁes a ﬂoat adjusted market capitalization that
includes shares of stocks not considered available to ordinary investors. The data is available on the daily basis,
but the series used here is the price of the last trading day in each quarter. Investment is real private nonresidential
ﬁxed investment and GDP is the real gross domestic product, both of which are available at the US Department
of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. The bond price index is the price of the three-month Treasury bills
at the secondary market rate, available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. All variables
depicted here are quarterly and ﬁltered through the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a parameter 1600.





































































bonddev x50A more intuitive explanation for the patterns depicted in Figures 1.1 - 1.3 is that the asset
market is an important cause of, instead of a mere response to, the business cycle. Because the
price of liquid assets such as Treasury bills increases in a recession and decreases in a boom, a
natural hypothesis is as follows: There are shocks to the liquidity of the equity market that serve
as an independent cause of the business cycle. In particular, sudden drops in the liquidity of
the equity market cause equity price to fall. In a world where ﬁrms face ﬁnancing constraints on
investment, this reduction in equity price reduces ﬁrms’ ability to ﬁnance investment through the
equity market. Investment falls, output falls and a recession starts.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) have formulated this hypothesis (the Kiyotaki-Moore hypothesis,
henceforth) with a model that places two equity-market frictions at the center. One is the
diﬃculty to issue new equity: a ﬁrm can issue new equity to ﬁnance at most a fraction θ ∈ (0,1)
of investment. Another friction is the lack of resaleability of the existing equity; that is, only
a fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of the existing equity can be resold in any given period. Although both
frictions are necessary for making the ﬁnancing constraint on investment binding for ﬁrms in the
equilibrium, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) focus on the resaleability of the existing equity. This
f o c u si sj u s t i ﬁed by the fact that new equity is very small relative to the value of the existing
equity. Modeling a negative shock to equity liquidity as an unexpected exogenous drop in equity
resaleability, they argue that the shock has large and persistent eﬀects on aggregate variables.
The Kiyotaki-Moore hypothesis has received wide attention because of its immediate policy
implication. If unexpected ﬂuctuations in equity liquidity are a cause of the business cycle, then
a government should and can attenuate the business cycle by making the supply of liquid assets
counter-cyclical. Speciﬁcally, at the onset of a recession, a government should use liquid assets to
buy up some of the illiquid equity in order to prevent equity price from falling precipitously. The
increase in the supply of liquid assets relaxes ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints, and the stabilization of
equity price improves ﬁrms’ ability to use the equity market to ﬁnance investment. Both eﬀects
can reduce the magnitude of a recession. This policy implication seems to provide a justiﬁcation
for the large and repeated injections of liquidity by the US Federal Reserve System and some
other central banks in the recent recession.
Given the intuitive appeal and the immediate policy implication of the Kiyotaki-Moore hy-
pothesis, it is important to investigate formally and clearly how a liquidity shock works in a
macro model. In their paper, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) formulate the equilibrium as a sequence
problem which makes it diﬃcult to illustrate how the liquidity shock works in a stochastic and
dynamic environment. Another issue is aggregation. For the ﬁnancing constraint on investment
to have force, the model must distinguish entrepreneurs, who undertake investment, from other
2individuals such as workers. To aggregate the decisions of diﬀerent types of individuals, the
model requires a special utility function (logarithmic) and, even in that case, aggregation is quite
involved. A few authors have extended the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) by adding the
elements that are popular in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, such as wage/price
rigidity, adjustment costs in investment and habit persistence in consumption. After calibrating
such models, Ajello (2010) ﬁnd that liquidity shocks account for a large part of the US business
cycle and Del Negro, et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the US Fed policy might have prevented a greater
recession in the last few years. The additional elements in these models are intended to be real-
istic for analyzing monetary policy, but they make it diﬃcult to dissect the models to evaluate
the Kiyotaki-Moore hypothesis.
In this paper, I try to accomplish two tasks. The ﬁrst is to construct a theoretical model to
simplify the formulation of the Kiyotaki-Moore hypothesis. This model provides straightforward
aggregation and leads to a natural deﬁnition of the recursive competitive equilibrium in subsection
2.3. This tractable formulation may be useful broadly for studying the role of the asset market
in macro. The second task is to calibrate the model to evaluate the Kiyotaki-Moore hypothesis
quantitatively. By computing the dynamic response of the equilibrium to shocks, I reach some
surprising results regarding the role of equity market liquidity in the business cycle, some of which
are opposite to what one may conjecture. The transparent formulation in my paper allows me to
e x p l a i nt h e s er e s u l t si ns e c t i o n3a n ds u g g e s tdirections of future research in section 4.
Financial frictions have been the focus of business cycle research for quite some time. The
literature is too large to be surveyed here (see Bernanke, et al., 1999, for a partial survey). A
majority of this literature emphasizes the role of ﬁnancial intermediation and the implied ﬁnancial
multiplier/accelerator of the business cycle. One particularly fruitful approach is the so-called
costly state veriﬁcation (e.g., Townsend, 1979). In this approach, ﬁnancial intermediaries arise to
economize on the cost of lending to and monitoring entrepreneurs in a world where entrepreneurs
have private information on their projects’ outcome. Williamson (1987) is one of the ﬁrst to
integrate this approach into a dynamic macro model to study the business cycle. The approach
has gained momentum through inﬂuential papers such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990). A
more recent example is Liu, et al. (2010). The main character in the play in this literature is net
worth of entrepreneurs and/or ﬁnancial intermediaries, whose pro-cyclical ﬂuctuations generate
the ﬁnancial multiplier. This approach provides important insights into the role of ﬁnancial
intermediaries in the business cycle, but it does not necessarily require the equity market to play
a central role. In contrast, the equity market is the central character of the Kiyotaki-Moore
hypothesis. To evaluate this hypothesis, I abstract from ﬁnancial intermediaries and, in fact,
3from debt-ﬁnancing entirely as Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) do.2
2. A Macro Model with Asset Market Frictions
2.1. The model environment
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy with discrete time. The economy is populated by a con-
tinuum of households, with measure one. Each household has a unit measure of members. At
the beginning of each period, all members of a household are identical and share the household’s
assets. During the period, the members are separated from each other and each member receives
a shock that determines the role of the member in the period. With probability π ∈ (0,1), a
member will be an entrepreneur and, with probability 1−π, the member will be a worker in the
period. These shocks are iid across the members and time. An entrepreneur has an investment
project and no labor endowment, while a worker has one unit of labor endowment and no invest-
ment project. The members’ preferences are aggregated and represented by the following utility
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Here, the expectation is taken over aggregate shocks (A,φ) which will be described below. The
parameter β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, ce
t an entrepreneur’s consumption, cw
t aw o r k e r ’ s
consumption, and  t a worker’s labor supply. The functions u, U and h are assumed to have
standard properties. To maximize the above utility function, the household chooses the actions
for all members, and the members simply implement the household’s choices. In the presence of ex
post heterogeneity among the individuals, this household structure allows me to easily aggregate
individuals’ quantities to construct macro aggregates.3
Let me describe the technologies in the economy together with the timing of events in
an arbitrary period t. A period is divided into three stages: households’ decisions, invest-
ment/production, and consumption. In the stage of households’ decisions, all members of a
household are together and they pool their assets. Aggregate shocks (At,φ t) are realized.4 The
household holds (physical) capital kt, equity claims st, and liquid assets bt. Capital resides in
the household and will be rented later to ﬁrms that produce consumption goods in the second
stage. Equity consists of all of the household’s claims on the household’s own capital and other
2The focus on the equity market may bring up the question whether monetary policy should take asset price
ﬂuctuations into account. For the debate on this issue, see Gilchrist and Leahy (2002).
3As i m i l a rh o u s e h o l ds t r u c t u r eh a sb e e nu s e di nm o n etary theory (e.g., Lucas, 1990, and Shi, 1997).
4This timing of aggregate shocks simpliﬁes the analysis. If At and φt are realized in the second stage, instead,
there may be precautionary holdings of assets.
4households’ capital.5 Liquid assets include government bonds. Because all members of the house-
hold are identical in this stage, the household evenly divides the assets among the members. The
household also gives each member the instructions on the choices in the period contingent on
whether the member will be an entrepreneur or a worker in the second stage. For an entrepre-
neur, the household instructs him to consume an amount ce
t,i n v e s tit, and hold a portfolio of
equity and liquid assets (se
t+1,b e
t+1)a tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .F o raw o r k e r ,t h eh o u s e h o l di n s t r u c t s
him to consume an amount cw
t , supply labor  t, and hold a portfolio of equity and liquid assets
(sw
t+1,b w
t+1) at the end of the period. After receiving these instructions, the members go to the
market and will remain separated from each other until the beginning of the next period.
At the beginning of the investment/production stage, each member receives the shock whose
realization determines whether the individual is an entrepreneur or a worker. Competitive ﬁrms




where the superscript d indicates the demand for productive factors and the function F has
constant returns to scale. Total factor productivity A follows a Markov process. A worker
supplies the amount  t of labor to the ﬁrms. An entrepreneur receives an investment project
which uses consumption goods as the input to produce capital goods. To simplify, let me assume
that each unit of the input produces one unit of capital good, and so an amount of investment it
will increase the household’s capital stock next period by it. In this stage, the asset market and
the goods market are open. Individuals trade assets to ﬁnance new investments and to achieve
the portfolios of equity and liquid assets instructed earlier by their households. Wage income and
the rental income of capital are available to the individuals in this stage.6
In the consumption stage, a worker consumes the amount cw
t and an entrepreneur the amount
ce
t. A fraction (1 − σ) of existing capital depreciates, where σ ∈ (0,1), and the newly produced
capital goods add to the capital stock. Then, individuals return to their households, arriving at
the beginning of the next period.
There are two liquidity frictions that constrain an entrepreneur’s ability to ﬁnance new in-
vestment, as modeled by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). The ﬁrst is a constraint on new equity: an
entrepreneur can issue equity on only a fraction θ ∈ (0,1) of new investment. The second is a
constraint on re-selling equity: an individual can re-sell only a fraction φt ∈ (0,1) of the existing
5As in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), I assume that claims on the household’s own capital and other households’
capital have the same liquidity. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis because it implies that the two subsets of
claims have the same price.
6I will discuss this assumption on timing at the end of subsection 3.3.
5equity in his portfolio. One may be able to explicitly specify the impediments in the asset market
that generate these bounds, θ and φ.7 As a ﬁrst pass, however, I take θ and φ as exogenous
elements of the model as do Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). Let me refer to θ as the equity-issuing
bound and φ as equity resaleability. Also following Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), I focus on equity
resaleability by assuming that θ is constant and φ follows a Markov process. Shocks to φ are
interpreted as shocks to equity liquidity.
The asset market frictions amount to putting a lower bound on the amount of equity that
an entrepreneur must hold at the end of the period. Because of the equity-issuing bound, an
entrepreneur must hold onto an amount (1 − θ)it of the new capital to be formed by investment
it. On the existing equity, st, the entrepreneur must hold onto at least the amount (1 − φt)st,
and only a fraction σ of such equity survives depreciation. These new and old equities will both
become the existing equity at the beginning of the next period. Thus, the amount of equity that
the entrepreneur holds at the end of the period, se
t+1, must satisfy the following constraint:
se
t+1 ≥ (1 − θ)it +( 1− φt)σst.( 2 . 1 )
This is the liquidity constraint on equity.
For the liquidity constraint (2.1) to be eﬀective, an entrepreneur must face a tight borrowing
limit. I set this limit to zero. Note that the borrowing constraint is made explicitly by the timing
of events in a period and, particularly, by temporary separation of the members from each other in
a period. This separation ensures that a household cannot shift funds among the members in the
investment/production stage. If a household could freely channel funds among the members in
this stage, there would be a need to take some resource from workers and give it to entrepreneurs
to ﬁnance investment. In this case, (2.1) would not be binding.
2.2. A household’s decisions
I formulate a household’s decisions with dynamic programming and the equilibrium as a recursive
competitive equilibrium. To do so, let me specify the aggregate state of the economy and price
functions. Consider an arbitrary period, suppress the time subscript t, and add the subscripts
+1 to the variables in the next period. The aggregate state of the economy at the beginning
of the period is (K,Z), where K is the stock of capital per household and Z =( A,φ)i st h e
7For example, if new investment diﬀers in quality which is the entrepreneur’s private information, then the
entrepreneur may not be able to ﬁnance the investment entirely with equity. Also, if investment requires an
enterpreneur’s (non-contractible) labor input as well as the input of goods, then moral hazard on labor input
may put an upper bound on θ (see Hart and Moore, 1994). The upper bound φ may be caused by the common
characteristics of all equity that are unknown to the market.
6realizations of exogenous shocks to total factor productivity and equity resaleability. I omit the
amount of equity per household from the list of aggregate state variables because it is equal to
the aggregate capital stock. Also, I ﬁx the supply of liquid assets at B ≥ 0 and omit it from the
list of aggregate variables. Let equity price be q(K,Z), the price of liquid assets pb(K,Z), the
rental rate of capital r(K,Z), and the wage rate w(K,Z). These prices of assets and productive
factors are expressed in terms of the consumption good, which is the numeraire in the model.8
A household’s state variables consist of equity claims, s, and liquid assets, b, in addition to the
aggregate state. Denote the household’s value function as v(s,b;K,Z). Recall that a household’s
choices are as follows. For an entrepreneur, the household instructs him to invest i,c o n s u m ece,
and hold a portfolio (se
+1,b e
+1) at the end of the period. The subscripts +1 are used here because
the member will hold onto the portfolio until the beginning of the next period. For a worker, the
household instructs him to supply labor  ,c o n s u m ecw, and hold a portfolio (sw
+1,b w
+1)a tt h ee n d
of the period. The household’s choices (i,ce,s e
+1,b e
+1, ,c w,s w
+1,b w
+1)s o l v e :
v(s,b;K,Z)=m a x {πu (ce)+( 1− π)[U(cw) − h( )] + β Ev(s+1,b +1;K+1,Z +1)} (2.2)
subject to (2.1) and the following constraints:
rs+ q(i + σs− se
+1)+( b − pbbe
+1) − τ ≥ i + ce,( 2 . 3 )
rs+ w + q(σs− sw
+1)+( b − pbbw
+1) − τ ≥ cw,( 2 . 4 )
i ≥ 0, ce ≥ 0, se
+1 ≥ 0, be
+1 ≥ 0, (2.5)
cw ≥ 0, sw
+1 ≥ 0, bw
+1 ≥ 0, (2.6)
s+1 = πse
+1 +( 1− π)sw
+1, b+1 = πbe
+1 +( 1− π)bw
+1.( 2 . 7 )
The expectation in the objective function is taken over next period’s aggregate state (K+1,Z +1).
I have suppressed the arguments of price functions r, w, q and pb in the constraints above.
Constraint (2.3) is an entrepreneur’s resource constraint. The entrepreneur needs to ﬁnance
consumption, ce, investment, i, and the tax liability, τ. The funds include income from equity,
rs, the receipt from selling the existing equity and issuing new equity, q(i + σs − se
+1), and the
receipt from adjusting the holdings of liquid assets, (b−pbbe
+1). Note that the liquidity constraint
(2.1) ensures that the receipt from equity is strictly positive, which prevents the entrepreneur
from going short on equity. Also note that I model liquid assets in a way similar to bonds; that
is, each unit of matured liquid asset can be sold for one unit of consumption good while new
8As is standard, the price of equity is the so-called post-dividend price; i.e., it is measured after the rental
income of capital is distributed to shareholders.
7liquid assets are sold at price pb. Thus, liquid assets have a positive net rate of return if and
only if pb < 1. Constraint (2.4) is an analogous constraint on a worker’s resource, except that a
worker receives labor income and does not have an investment project.
The non-negativity constraints in (2.5) ensure that an entrepreneur cannot borrow, and the
constraints in (2.6) are similar constraints on a worker. The conditions in (2.7) are adding-up
constraints on the members’ holdings of equity and liquid assets at the end of the period.
To emphasize the choices for the entrepreneurs, I reformulate the household’s decisions as the
choices of (i,ce,s e
+1,b e
+1)a n d(  ,c,s+1,b +1), where c is the average consumption level per member
in the household deﬁned as
c = πce +( 1− π)cw.( 2 . 8 )
Using (2.7) and (2.8), I can replace the choices for a worker, (cw,s w
+1,b w
+1), with functions of
(ce,s e
+1,b e
+1)a n d( c,s+1,b +1). In particular, I can replace the resource constraint on a worker,
(2.4), with a resource constraint on the household. Multiplying (2.3) by π and (2.4) by 1 − π,
and adding up, I obtain the household’s resource constraint as
rs+( 1− π)w +( q − 1)πi+ q(σs− s+1)+( b − pbb+1) − τ ≥ c.( 2 . 9 )
Similarly, the non-negativity constraints in (2.6) can be expressed in terms of (ce,s e
+1,b e
+1)a n d
(c,s+1,b +1). This new formulation of the household’s decision problem has already incorporated
the constraints in (2.7). So, the constraints are (2.1), (2.3), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.9).
It is instructive to combine the liquidity constraint, (2.1), and an entrepreneur’s resource
constraint, (2.3), to eliminate se
+1. Doing so yields
(r + φσq)s +( b − pbbe
+1) − τ ≥ ce +( 1− θq)i. (2.10)
This constraint reveals two features of an entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing constraint. First, the resaleabil-
ity of equity increases an entrepreneur’s ability to ﬁnance investment. Second, the cost of each
unit of investment to an entrepreneur is 1−θq, which can be interpreted as the “downpayment”
on the investment. This interpretation is valid because the entrepreneur can issue θ shares of new
equity on each unit of investment to raise the amount of fund θq. The remainder of the required
fund, 1 − θq, has to come from the rental income and selling assets.
Note that an entrepreneur’s resource constraint (2.3) holds with equality, because the marginal
utility of consumption is strictly positive. Thus, an entrepreneur’s liquidity constraint (2.3) is
binding if and only if the combined constraint (2.10) is binding. For this reason, I refer to (2.10) as
the equity liquidity constraint.L e tλeπU0(cw) be the Lagrangian multiplier of the entrepreneur’s
8constraint, (2.10), where the rescaling by πU0(cw)s i m p l i ﬁes various expressions below. The
multiplier λe is a measure of liquidity services provided by the resource to an entrepreneur.
It is straightforward to use the ﬁrst-order condition of c to verify that the shadow price of the
household’s resource constraint, (2.9), is equal to U0(cw).9 Also, if an entrepreneur faces a binding
liquidity constraint, then it is optimal for him to spend the resource to ﬁnance new investment
rather than acquire new liquid assets. This implies λebe
+1 = 0. Moreover, the the optimal choices





q − 1 ≤ (1 − θq)λe and i ≥ 0, (2.13)
where the two inequalities in (2.13) hold with complementary slackness. Condition (2.11) is the
standard condition for optimal labor supply. Condition (2.12) captures the fact that a marginal
unit of the resource is more valuable to an entrepreneur than to a worker if an entrepreneur’s
liquidity constraint is binding, in which case the additional value to an entrepreneur is captured
by λeU0(cw). The conditions in (2.13) characterize the optimal choice of investment. As explained
above, the downpayment on each unit of investment in terms of goods is 1−θq,t h ec o s to fw h i c h
in terms of utility is (1 − θq)λeU0(cw). For the household, a unit of investment increases the
resource by (q − 1), the beneﬁt of which in terms of utility is (q − 1)U0(cw). Investment is zero
if the cost exceeds the beneﬁt, and positive if the cost is equal to the beneﬁt. The liquidity
constraint is binding, i.e., λe > 0, if and only if 1 <q<1/θ.
Finally, the optimality conditions on asset holdings at the end of the period and the envelope
conditions on asset holdings together give rise to the asset-pricing equations below:






r+1 + σq+1 + πλe
+1 (r+1 + φ+1σq+1)
¤¾
, (2.14)










The shadow price λe
+1 enters the right-hand sides of both pricing equations because the existing
equity and liquid assets can both be sold to raise funds for new investment, thereby relaxing the
liquidity constraint on an entrepreneur. However, only a fraction φ+1 of the existing equity can
be sold next period while all liquid assets can be sold. Thus, φ+1 appears in the pricing equation
for equity but not in that for liquid assets.
9The non-negativity constraints c
e ≥ 0, c
w ≥ 0, b+1 ≥ 0a n ds+1 ≥ 0 do not bind. The constraint s
e
+1 ≥ 0i s
not binding under (2.1), because the latter constraint imposes a strictly positive lower bound on s
e
+1.
92.3. Deﬁnition of a recursive equilibrium
Before deﬁning an equilibrium, let me specify government policies. As said earlier, the supply of
liquid assets per household is ﬁxed as B ≥ 0. Let me also assume that government spending per
household is a constant g. The government’s budget constraint is
g = τ +( pb − 1)B. (2.16)
Let K ⊂ R+ be a compact set which contains all possible values of K and Z ⊂ R+×[0,1] a
compact set which contains all possible values of Z.L e tC1 be the set containing all continuous
functions that map K×Z into R+, C2 the set containing all continuous functions that map
K×[0,B] ×K×Z into R+ and C3 the set containing all continuous functions that map K×
[0,B] ×K×Zinto R.
A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of asset and factor price functions (q,pb,r,w)
belonging in C1, a household’s policy functions (i,ce,s e
+1,b e
+1, ,c,s +1,b +1) belonging in C2,t h e
value function v ∈ C3, the demand for factors by ﬁnal-goods producers, (kd,  d), and the law of
motion of the aggregate capital stock such that the following requirements are met:
(i) Given price functions and the aggregate state, a household’s value and policy functions solve
a household’s optimization problem in (2.2);
(ii) Given price functions and the aggregate state, factor demands satisfy the optimality condi-
tions, r = AF0
1(kd,  d)a n dw = AF0
2(kd,  d), where the subscript 1 indicates that the derivative is
taken with respect to the ﬁrst argument and the subscript 2 the second argument;
(iii) Given the law of motion of the aggregate state, prices clear the markets:
goods: c(s,d;K,Z)+πi(s,d;K,Z)+g = AF(kd,  d), (2.17)
labor:  d =( 1− π) (s,d;K,Z), (2.18)
capital: kd = K = s, (2.19)
liquid assets: b+1(s,b;K,Z)=b ≡ B, (2.20)
equity: s+1(s,b;K,Z)=σs+ πi (s,b;K,Z); (2.21)
(iv) The law of motion of the aggregate capital stock is consistent with the aggregation of indi-
vidual households’ choices:
K+1 = σK + πi (K,B;K,Z). (2.22)
Requirements (i) and (ii) are self-explanatory. In requirement (iii), the market clearing condi-
tions for goods, labor, capital and liquid assets are easy to understand after taking into account
10that only the entrepreneurs invest and only workers supply labor. The equality K = s in the
capital market clearing condition states the fact that the households in the economy own all cap-
ital in the form of equity. In the equity market clearing condition, the amount of new investment
that adds to the existing stock of equity includes not only new equity sold to other households
but also new equity that a household retains. This is so because I deﬁne s to include the part of
equity that a household holds on its own capital. Condition (iv) is also self-explanatory. I impose
this requirement explicitly here because it is used by the households to compute the expectations
in (2.2). However, because K = s, the law of motion of the capital stock duplicates the equity
market clearing condition — a reﬂection of the Walras’ law.
Determining an equilibrium amounts to solving for asset price functions q(K,Z)a n dpb(K,Z).
Once these functions are determined, other equilibrium functions can be recovered from a house-
hold’s ﬁrst-order conditions, the Bellman equation in (2.2), the market clearing conditions and
factor demand conditions. To solve for asset price functions, I can use the right-hand sides of
asset pricing equations, (2.14) and (2.15), to construct a mapping T that maps a pair of functions
in C1 back into C1 (see Appendix A). The pair of functions (q,pb)i na ne q u i l i b r i u mi saﬁxed
point of T. I will implement this procedure numerically in subsection 3.1.
2.4. Value of liquidity and the equity premium
Liquidity has a positive value in this model only if an entrepreneur’s equity liquidity constraint,
(2.10), is binding. Precisely, the value of liquidity in the aggregate state (K,Z) can be measured
as πλe(K,Z) units of consumption, where λeπU0(cw) is the shadow price of (2.10). Note that




According to (2.15), liquid assets in the current model have a higher price than the standard one
if and only if liquidity is expected to have a positive value in the next period.
While a liquid asset provides full liquidity, equity provides only partial liquidity. By assump-
tion, the rental income generated by the existing equity, i.e., the one associated with r,c a nb e
used to ﬁnance new investment. So can the fraction φ of the equity itself. Thus, an intuitive
measure of the value of liquidity provided by a unit of the existing equity is (πλe)
r+φσq
r+σq .T h e







= πλe(1 − φ)σq
r + σq
. (2.23)
Intuitively, this additional value is strictly positive if and only if liquidity has a positive value
(i.e., if λe > 0) and if the existing equity is not fully liquid (i.e., if φ<1).
11The measure ∆ is in terms of consumption units. An alternative way to measure the lower
liquidity of equity is the equity premium, i.e., the additional rate of return that equity must
provide relative to liquid assets in order to compensate for its lower liquidity. The gross rate of
return to equity, not counting its role in relaxing the liquidity constraint, will be (r+1 +σq+1)/q,
and the gross rate of return to liquid assets will be 1/pb. The realized equity premium in the
next period will be (
r+1+σq+1
q − 1
pb). The equity premium is closely related to the measure ∆.
The asset-pricing equations (2.14) and (2.15) imply that the equity premium is strictly positive
on average if and only if the value of the additional liquidity provided by liquid assets relative to






























2.5. Non-stochastic steady state
In the non-stochastic steady state, the exogenous state is constant at Z = Z∗,w h e r eZ∗ =
(A∗,φ ∗), and all endogenous variables are constant over time. In the steady state, investment is
strictly positive because it is equal to i∗ =( 1− σ)K∗/π > 0. By (2.13), the shadow price of the
equity liquidity constraint in the steady state is
λe∗ =
q∗ − 1
1 − θq∗. (2.24)
The asset-pricing equations, (2.14) and (2.15), yield the following steady-state relations:
λe∗ =




b = β(1 + πλe∗). (2.26)
The two equations, (2.24) and (2.25), determine (λe∗,q∗). Substituting these solutions into (2.26)
yields p∗
b. Other steady-state conditions are:
u0(ce∗)=U0(cw∗)
(1 − θ)q∗
1 − θq∗ , (2.27)
c∗ = AF(K∗,(1 − π) ∗) − (1 − σ)K∗ − g, (2.28)
p∗
bB = g + ce∗ −
∙






12Equation (2.27) is the steady-state version of the ﬁrst-order condition of ce, (2.12), with λe∗ being
substituted. Equation (2.28) is the steady-state version of the goods-market clearing condition,
and (2.29) is the steady-state version of the liquidity constraint, (2.10). Together with r∗ = AF1
and h0( ∗)=U0(cw∗)AF2, (2.25) - (2.29) solve for (q∗,p ∗
b,c e∗,c ∗,K∗,r∗,  ∗).
3. Equilibrium Response to Shocks
In this section I calibrate the model and examine the response of the equilibrium to shocks to
total factor productivity and the resaleability of equity.
3.1. Calibration and computation





h( )=h0 η, F(K,(1 − π) )=Kα [(1 − π) ]
1−α .
For the exogenous state of the economy (A,φ), I assume that logA and −log(1
φ − 1) obey:















+ εφ,t+1.( 3 . 2 )
These processes are convenient because they ensure A ≥ 0a n dφ ∈ [0,1]. The quantitative
analysis below will often take εA and εφ as one-time shocks.
I use the non-stochastic steady state to calibrate the model and choose the length of a period
in the model to be one quarter. The procedure is described is Appendix B. The following targets
and parameter values are standard in macro calibration. The value of the discount factor β and
the relative risk aversion are common. The elasticity of labor supply is equal to two and aggregate
hours of work in the steady state are 0.25. The share of labor income in output is 1 − α =0 .64,
the ratio of annual investment to capital in the steady state is 4(1 − σ)=0 .076, and the ratio
of capital to annual output is 3.32. The steady state value of productivity is normalized to
A∗ = 1 and the degree of persistence of productivity shocks is δA =0 .95. The level of government
spending g is set to be 18% of the steady state level of output. Note that the parameter u0 is
identiﬁed by the ratio of capital to output because u0 aﬀects entrepreneur’s consumption which
in turn aﬀects the rental rate of capital and the capital stock.
Let me discuss the remaining identiﬁcation restrictions. First, the parameter π can be inter-
preted as the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust their capital in a period. The estimate of this fraction
13on the annual basis ranges from 0.20 (Doms and Dunne, 1998) to 0.40 (Cooper, et al., 1999). I
choose a value 0.24 in this range, which leads to π =0 .06. Second, I set θ to be equal to φ∗ as
ab e n c h m a r k .I fi ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult to issue new equity than resell equity, then θ<φ ∗ and the
liquidity constraint is more binding than in the benchmark case. Third, for the shocks to the
resaleability of equity to generate persistent eﬀects, the shocks must be persistent. Thus, I set
δφ =0 .9 in the baseline calibration. Fourth, the rate of return to liquid assets and the fraction of
liquid assets in the total value of assets come from the evidence in Del Negro, et al. (2010). These
authors report that the annualized net rate of return to the US government liabilities is 1.72%
for one-year maturities and 2.57% for ten-year maturities. I choose the value 0.02, which lies
between these two rates of return.10 Finally, Del Negro, et al. (2010) use the US Flow of Funds
between 1952 and 2008 to compute the share of liquid assets in asset holdings. Their measure of
liquid assets consists of all liabilities of the Federal Government, that is, Treasury securities net of
holdings by the monetary authority and the budget agency plus reserves, vault cash and currency
net of remittances to the Federal Government. The sample average of the share of liquidity assets
is close to 0.12, which I target in the calibration.
Table 1. Parameters and calibration targets
parameter value calibration target
β:d i s c o u n tf a c t o r 0.992 exogenously chosen
ρ: relative risk aversion 2 exogenously chosen
π: fraction of entrepreneurs 0.06 annual fraction of investing ﬁrms = 0.24
u0: constant in entrep. utility 44.801 capital stock/annual output = 3.32
h0: constant in labor disutility 17.005 hours of work = 0.25
η: curvature in labor disutility 1.5 labor supply elasticity 1/(η − 1) = 2
α: capital share 0.36 labor income share (1 − α)=0 .64
σ: survival rate of capital 0.981 annual investment/capital = 0.076
A∗: steady-state TFP 1 normalization
δA: persistence in TFP 0.95 persistence in TFP = 0.95
B: stock of liquid assets 2.0204 fraction of liquid assets in portfolio = 0.12
φ∗: steady-state resaleability 0.276 annual return to liquid assets = 0.02
δφ: persistence in resaleability 0.9 exogenously chosen
θ: fraction of new equity 0.276 set to equal to φ∗
g: government spending 0.1928 government spending/GDP = 0.18
Let me brieﬂym e n t i o ns o m eo ft h ei d e n t i ﬁed values. First, equity resaleability in the steady
state is φ∗ =0 .276. Because this is signiﬁcantly less than one, the resale market for equity is far
from being liquid. Notice that φ∗ is identiﬁed by the target that the annual yield on liquid assets
10Note that the pricing equation for liquid assets in the steady state imposes the constraint p
∗
b ≥ β.T h u s ,g i v e n
the value of β, the upper bound on the annual rate of return to liquid assets is β
−4 − 1=0 .0327. Thus, the value
chosen for the rate of return to liquid assets is close to the middle point in the feasible region.
14is 0.02. If assets were liquid, then the yield on liquid assets would be β−1/4 − 1=0 .0327. So,
another way to phrase the result on φ∗ is that equity resaleability needs to fall from one to 0.276
in order for the steady state to generate a diﬀerential of 127 basis points between the annual
discount rate and the yield on liquid assets. Second, in the steady state, the rental rate of capital
is r∗ =0 .0271 and the price of equity is q∗ =1 .0367. It is diﬃcult to map this price of equity
t oas p e c i ﬁc price index of stocks because equity in this model represents a broad collection of
assets other than the particular group of liquid assets mentioned above. Third, the annualized
equity premium in the steady state is 4(r∗/q∗ +σ −1/p∗
b)=0 .0087. This premium is signiﬁcant,
considering that it is the equity premium in a steady state where no risk is present.
Suppose that the error terms in the processes of A and φ are zero. That is, the paths of A
and φ are all realized at the beginning of t = 1, which is the case with one-time shocks. I follow
the procedure in Appendix A to compute equilibrium asset price functions (q,pb)(K,Z), where
Z =( A,φ). Then, I recover an individual household’s policy functions x(s,b;K,Z), where x is
any element in the list (c,i,ce,s e
+1, ,c w,s +1,b +1). Since the equilibrium has s = K and b = B,
where B is a constant, I shorten the notation x(K,B;K,Z)a sx(K,Z).
Most of the policy functions have predictable properties. For example, consumption, invest-
ment and output are increasing functions of the capital stock, K. An exception might be the
dependence of asset prices on the capital stock. For most values of the capital stock, equity price
and the price of liquid assets are decreasing functions of the capital stock. On equity price, a
plausible explanation is that as the capital stock increases, the rental rate of capital falls which
reduces equity price. On the price of liquid assets, a plausible explanation is that as the capital
stock increases, the need for further investment falls, which reduces the demand for liquid assets.
3.2. Equilibrium response to an asset liquidity shock
Suppose the economy is in the non-stochastic steady state at time t = 0. Then, at the beginning
of t = 1, there is an unanticipated drop in the resaleability of equity from φ∗ to φ1 <φ ∗.A f t e r
this shock, equity resaleability follows the process in (3.2), with εφ,t =0f o ra l lt ≥ 2. To focus on
the eﬀect of this shock to equity resaleability, let me assume for the moment that the fraction of
new investment that can be ﬁnanced by issuing equity, θ, does not change. Similarly, total factor
productivity, A, is assumed to remain at the steady state level. I compute the dynamics of the
equilibrium using the procedure described in Appendix B. Note that I use the policy functions
and asset pricing functions to compute the dynamics instead of linearizing the equilibrium system.
This approach has the advantage of being able to deal with large shocks. To dramatize the eﬀect
of the liquidity shock, I assume that the shock reduces equity resaleability from 0.276 to 0.05, a





























































































Figure 2.2. Employment and output after a negative liquidity shock
Figure 2.1 graphs aggregate investment (I = πi) and equity resaleability, where the vertical
axis is percentage deviations of the variables from their steady-state levels and the horizontal axis
is the number of quarters after the shock. In period 1, the negative shock to equity resaleability
reduces investment by 90%. Although the negative shock to the resaleability is large by construc-
tion, this magnitude of the reduction in investment may still be surprising in the following sense.
Because θ is not reduced with φ in this experiment, entrepreneurs can still issue new equity to
ﬁnance new investment. The large fall in investment indicates that a majority of new investment
is ﬁnanced by selling existing equity rather than issuing new equity. Figure 2.1 also shows that
investment closely follows the dynamics of equity resaleability. Because equity resaleability is
16assumed to be persistent, with a persistence parameter 0.9, the shock has persistent eﬀects on
investment. Four years after the shock, investment is still about 16% below the steady state.
Figure 2.2 exhibits aggregate employment (L =( 1− π) ) and output (Y ). Both variables
fall by a large amount when the negative shock to equity resaleability hits. Employment falls by
27% and output by 18% in period 1. Such magnitudes are comparable to the ones in the Great
Depression. Note that the reduction in output in period 1 comes entirely from the reduction in
employment, because the capital stock in period 1 is predetermined and total factor productivity
is ﬁxed. After period 1, however, the capital stock also falls below the steady state due to lower
investment, which contributes to the lower level of output. The eﬀects of the negative shock to
equity resaleability are persistent. Four years after the shock, employment is still 5% below the
steady state and output 4% below the steady state. These responses of aggregate investment,
employment and output seem to suggest that a liquidity shock to the resale market of equity can
















































Figure 2.3. Asset prices after a negative liquidity shock
One can question whether shocks to equity resaleability are as persistent as I assumed. Instead
of getting into this debate, let me check how asset prices respond to the liquidity shock. As
Figure 2.3 shows, a negative liquidity shock to the equity market generates an asset price boom!
Immediately after the shock, equity price increases by 30% and the price of liquid assets increases
by 7%. Asset prices stay above the steady state for quite a long time. Four years after the
shock, equity price is still 4.5% above the steady state and the price of liquid assets is 2.3% above
the steady state. Thus, the negative liquidity shock to the asset market can generate large and
persistent ﬂuctuations in equity price, but the problem is that the direction of these ﬂuctuations
17is opposite to what is typically observed in the business cycle (e.g., Figure 1.1).11
3.3. What is the source of this problem?
One suspicion is that the liquidity shock is so large that non-linearity of the equilibrium system
generates erratic responses in asset prices. To eliminate this suspicion, I have computed smaller
shocks to equity liquidity and still found that a negative shock to equity resaleability increases
asset prices. The second suspicion is that the exercise above has ﬁxed θ. Whatever that makes
it more diﬃcult to re-sell equity, it may also increase the diﬃculty to issue new equity. That is,
θ is likely to fall in an episode when φ falls. This joint reduction in θ and φ can certainly be
investigated and I will take up the issue later.
The other suspicion is that the model lacks some realistic ingredients. As a result, some other
variables respond to the liquidity shock in the incorrect magnitude or direction and, to make up
for these unrealistic responses in other variables, equity price ends up responding in the wrong
direction. Indeed, one can have a long list of the ingredients in a typical dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model that I have omitted. The following is a partial list:
(i) Wage rigidity: the absence of it in my model may imply that output does not fall enough
after the negative liquidity shock;
(ii) Adjustment costs of investment: the absence of these costs may imply that investment may
fall by too much immediately after the negative liquidity shock;
(iii) Habit persistence in consumption: the absence of this ingredient may imply that consump-
tion responds to the liquidity shock by too much or in the wrong direction.
These items are related. In particular, if the fall in output is suﬃciently deﬁcient and the fall
in investment is suﬃciently large, then consumption must increase after the negative liquidity
shock in order to satisfy the resource constraint. To check this, I have computed the dynamics
of consumption (not graphed here). After the negative liquidity shock described above, an en-
trepreneur’s consumption falls by about 6% and returns to the steady state slowly from below,
and a worker’s consumption increases by about 14.4% and falls toward the steady state from
above. Because workers are 94% of the population in the model, aggregate consumption per
capita increases by 8.4% on the impact of the shock and falls toward the steady state from above.
11Other authors (e.g., Ajello, 2010) also ﬁnd this paradoxical response of equity price to an equity liquidity shock.
However, their models have many additional elements that make this result less transparent. Instead of focusing
on this result, they focus on other predictions of the model, such as the role of liquidity shocks in explaining output
ﬂuctuations and the eﬀects of monetary policy.
18Thus, indeed, the absence of items (i)-(iii) above makes aggregate consumption respond to the
negative liquidity shock in a direction opposite to what one observes in business cycles. Given
this apparent defect of the model, one may start putting items (i)-(iii) above into the model.
Such an eﬀort will be futile in correcting the response of equity price to the liquidity shock. So
will the eﬀort of allowing θ to fall together with the negative liquidity shock. I make these state-
ments basing on a simple calculation of the marginal beneﬁt and cost of investment. Speciﬁcally,
the optimal amount of investment that a household should instruct an entrepreneur to undertake
must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions in (2.13). For the sake of argument, let me
focus on the case where investment is positive. In this case, (2.13) becomes:
q − 1=( 1− θq)λe.( 3 . 3 )
Because this equation is central to the argument, let me repeat the meanings of the terms in it.
For each share of equity issued on investment, the price is q,a n ds ot h eb e n e ﬁt from issuing equity
to ﬁnance a unit of investment is (q−1). If there were no frictions on issuing new equity, this term
would be the net beneﬁt of issuing equity, in which case investment could be positive and ﬁnite
in the equilibrium if and only if q = 1. When there are frictions in issuing new equity, as modeled
by θ<1, the fraction of investment ﬁnanced with new equity is θq. The entrepreneur must use
other (liquid) resources to ﬁnance the remainder of investment, 1−θq, which is referred to as the
downpayment on a unit of investment. The cost of this downpayment depends on how tight the
equity liquidity constraint (2.10) is, as measured by the shadow price λe of the constraint. Thus,
(1−θq)λe is the marginal cost of a unit of investment. Condition (3.3) requires the net marginal
beneﬁt of investment to be zero.
The marginal beneﬁt of investment is a strictly increasing function of q and the downpayment
on investment is a strictly decreasing function of q. Thus, for any given λe, the net marginal
beneﬁt of investment is a strictly increasing function of q. When there is a negative shock to
liquidity, the implicit cost of raising funds to ﬁnance the downpayment of investment increases.
That is, the equity liquidity constraint (2.10) becomes tighter and its shadow price λe increases.
The higher λe reduces the net marginal beneﬁt of investment for any given equity price. To restore
the balance between the marginal beneﬁt and cost of investment, equity price must increase. As
liquid resources become more scarce, the price of liquid assets, pb,a l s oi n c r e a s e s .
This argument is quite general, because it only requires the negative liquidity shock to tighten
the liquidity constraint, which is what the shock is supposed to do. At the risk of over-simplifying
the problem, let me phrase it in terms of the demand for and the supply of equity. A reduction
in equity resaleability reduces the supply of equity. Because the demand for equity is not aﬀected
19so much by the reduction, the price of equity must increase to clear the market. Mathematically,
the equation on which I have relied to illustrate the problem, (3.3), involves only two variables,
(q,λe), and one parameter θ. All other details, such as the resaleability of equity and the price
of liquid assets, do not direct enter this condition. Instead, whatever eﬀect they can exert on
equity price must go through λe. With this generality, the argument can survive a wide range of
extensions/modiﬁcations of the model and the liquidity shock.
Consider ﬁrst the possibility that the same force that makes existing equity less liquid also
makes it more diﬃcult to issue new equity. In this case, θ falls when there is a negative shock to
equity resaleability φ. This concurrent fall in θ with φ is likely to make the equity price boom even
larger. To see this, note that, for any given equity price, a fall in θ increases the downpayment on
each unit of investment. This increases the marginal cost of investment. To restore the balance
between the marginal beneﬁt and cost of investment, equity price must rise even further after a
negative liquidity shock.
Now let me make inferences on what will happen if the ingredients (i)-(iii) above are introduced
into the model. It is clear that wage rigidity and habit persistence in consumption do not directly
aﬀect the marginal beneﬁt and cost of investment. Their indirect eﬀects may tighten the equity
liquidity constraint, (2.10), even further and exacerbate the problem of the response of equity
price to a liquidity shock. To see this, consider wage rigidity ﬁrst. When there is a fall in equity
liquidity, output is likely to fall by more with rigid wages than with ﬂexible wages. Similarly,
the rental income of capital will fall by more when wages are rigid. Because this rental income
is part of the resource which an entrepreneur uses to ﬁnance investment, the equity liquidity
constraint (2.10) is likely to become tighter, and so equity price is likely to rise by more with
rigid wages than with ﬂexible wages. Next consider habit persistence in consumption. When an
entrepreneur’s consumption cannot respond quickly to a negative liquidity shock, the entrepreneur
needs resource not only to ﬁnance investment but also to support persistently high consumption.
Again, the equity liquidity constraint (2.10) is likely to be tighter, which requires equity price to
increase by more than if there is no habit persistence.
The consequences of introducing (ii), an adjustment cost in investment, are more complicated
than introducing (i) and (iii), because the adjustment cost directly aﬀects the condition for opti-
mal investment. For concreteness, let i∗Ψ(i/i∗) be the additional resource that an entrepreneur
must incur in order to invest an amount i,w h e r ei∗ is the steady-state level of investment by
an individual entrepreneur.12 Impose the usual assumptions: Ψ(1) = 0, Ψ0(1) = 0, and Ψ00 > 0.
With the adjustment cost, a unit of investment at the margin needs (1 + Ψ0) units of resources.
12Del Negro et al. (2010) use this speciﬁcation of the adjustment cost.
20Thus, the optimality condition for investment is modiﬁed as
q − (1 + Ψ0)=( 1+Ψ0 − θq)λe.( 3 . 4 )
For any given (q,λe), the marginal beneﬁt of investment is a decreasing function of i and the
marginal cost an increasing function of i.T h u s , t h e n e t m a r g i n a l b e n e ﬁt of investment is a
decreasing function of i. If investment falls after a negative shock to equity liquidity, then the
marginal adjustment cost falls. Such savings of the adjustment cost increase the net marginal
beneﬁt of investment for any given (q,λe) and mitigates the increase in equity price caused by
t h ei n c r e a s ei nλe.F o r t h i s e ﬀect to be strong, the marginal cost of adjusting investment, Ψ0,
must be suﬃciently steep and the reduction in investment must be suﬃciently small, which may
be inconsistent with the large observed reduction in investment at the beginning of a recession
(see Figure 1.1). Moreover, when the adjustment cost prevents investment from falling sharply
after a negative shock to equity liquidity, an entrepreneur must raise enough resource to maintain
such investment. As a result, the equity liquidity constraint (2.10) is likely to be tighter with the
adjustment cost than without. That is, λe is likely to increase by more with the adjustment cost
than without. This eﬀect of the adjustment cost on λe is likely to dominate the savings in the
adjustment cost, which will require equity price to rise by more in order to satisfy the optimality
condition for investment, (3.4).
Let me now examine whether other speciﬁc assumptions of this model play a role in making
equity price increase after a negative liquidity shock. One is the structure of large households in
which the two groups of individuals, entrepreneurs and workers, pool their asset holdings at the
beginning of each period. This structure has simpliﬁed aggregation because heterogeneity between
the two groups of individuals does not persist through their asset holdings. In contrast, Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008) allow this heterogeneity to persist and so their model admits aggregation only
when entrepreneurs’ utility function is logarithmic. However, the household structure cannot be
the reason why equity price increases after a fall in equity resaleability. Relative to Kiyotaki and
Moore (2008), the household structure allows entrepreneurs in the next period to use some of
workers’ assets, which reduces the persistence of the tightening eﬀect of the negative liquidity
shock on the liquidity constraint. Thus, equity price should increase by even more in response to
a fall in equity resaleability if the household structure is not available.
Another assumption in this model and in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) is that the return to
existing shares in the period is immediately available to an entrepreneur. That is, the income rs
is available for ﬁnancing current investment, as can be seen from the entrepreneur’s constraint
(2.3). One may consider the alternative timing according to which the income rs is available only
21for ﬁnancing consumption at the end of the period but not for ﬁnancing investment in the current
period. In this case, a fall in equity resaleability will tighten the liquidity constraint to a greater
extent than it does in the current model and, hence, will increase equity price by even more.
4. Some Solutions to the Problem
Let me summarize the ﬁnding in the section above. A negative shock to equity resaleability can
have large negative eﬀects on investment, employment and output. But the same shock increases
the implicit cost of ﬁnancing new investment, which requires equity price to rise rather than fall
in order to restore the balance between the marginal beneﬁta n dc o s to fi n v e s t m e n t .
For equity price to fall after a negative liquidity shock, the equity liquidity constraint must
become less tight. To generate this paradoxical outcome, there must be other concurrent shocks
that suﬃciently reduce the need for investment in the economy. Various modiﬁcations of the
model examined in the previous section failed to accomplish this task because they had either
no direct eﬀect or very weak eﬀect on the need for investment. In this section I discuss some
candidates that may suﬃciently reduce entrepreneurs’ desire to invest. These concurrent shocks
do not have to be unrelated to the liquidity shock; instead, they may even be the cause of the
change in equity liquidity.
One obvious candidate is a negative shock to total factor productivity, A. An unexpected drop
in productivity reduces investment by reducing the marginal productivity of capital. If the shock
to productivity is suﬃciently persistent, then a household will scale down all members’ consump-
tion, including entrepreneurs’ consumption. These reductions in investment and consumption
reduce an entrepreneur’s expenditure, given by the right-hand side of the equity liquidity con-
straint (2.10). However, the negative shock to productivity may also reduce the rental income
of capital, rs, which appears on the left-hand side of (2.10). If the reductions in investment and
consumption dominate the reduction in the rental income, then the equity liquidity constraint
becomes less tight and equity price falls.
To illustrate this possibility, I compute the response of the equilibrium to simultaneous shocks
to φ and A. Suppose that the economy is in the steady state before t = 1 and, at the beginning
of t = 1, there are unanticipated reductions in φ about 8% and in A about 5%. After these
shocks, A and φ follow the deterministic dynamics of the processes in (3.1) and (3.2). Figure 3.1
depicts percentage deviations of A and φ from the steady state, while Figures 3.2 - 3.3 depict
percentage deviations of some endogenous variables from the steady state. By construction, total
factor productivity A and equity resaleability φ are both persistent, but total factor productivity
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Figure 3.1. Negative shocks to A and φ
Figure 3.2 conﬁrms the analysis that the two shocks reduce investment, consumption and
output. As explained earlier, the negative shock to liquidity alone increases consumption in the
current model. Thus, the reduction in consumption in Figure 3.2 reﬂects the fact that the negative
productivity shock dominates the liquidity shock. Figure 3.3 shows that, after the two shocks,
equity price falls and approaches the steady state from below. This response must mean that the
negative productivity shock reduces the tightness of the equity liquidity constraint. Moreover,
the bond price increases after the two shocks and stays above the steady state for eight quarters
before falling below the steady state. Thus, the liquidity shock does play a visible role in these
graphs. If the negative shock to productivity were the only shock, the bond price would fall.
The patterns in Figures 3.2 - 3.3 are broadly consistent with the patterns in the two recessions
depicted in Figures 1.1 - 1.3. In terms of the magnitude, the response of equity price in Figure
3.3 is about one-tenth of that observed in the trough of the two recessions. For other variables,
the responses in the two sets of graphs are not far apart in the magnitude. For example, in
the trough of the recent recession, investment is about 10% below the trend, GDP is 3% below
the trend, and the bond price is 0.35% above the trend. In Figures 3.2 - 3.3, the two shocks
reduce investment by 15% in investment, reduce output by 5%, and increase the bond price by
0.25%. The broad consistency between the two sets of graphs suggests that productivity shocks
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Figure 3.3. Asset prices following negative shocks to A and φ
Another force that can signiﬁcantly reduce the need for investment is a fall in the quality
of capital. If market participants perceive the quality of capital to deteriorate quickly at the
onset of a recession, they will move resources from equity to relative safe and liquid assets. This
will depress equity price and drive up the price of liquid assets. To model this process, let me
assume that the eﬀective capital stock, instead of the raw capital stock, appears in the production
function. Let the eﬀective capital stock be κK,w h e r eκ is the quality of capital. In this case,
total factor productivity is Aκα. Thus, a negative shock to the quality of capital is similar to a
negative shock to A examined above. This modeling approach does not allow for a non-degenerate
distribution of the quality of capital among the ﬁrms. For a model where this quality diﬀerence
is important, see Ajello (2010).13
13One may introduce the quality of investment rather than capital. For example, one may model the investment
24Finally, a drop in investment opportunities can also reduce the need for investment. This
shock can be modeled as an unexpected temporary fall in the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
population, π. Because a household’s utility is a weighted sum of entrepreneurs’ and workers’,
as h o c kt oπ is also a shock to a household’s preferences. Another way to model a drop in
investment opportunities is to assume that π is ﬁxed but only a fraction of entrepreneurs have in-
vestment opportunities in a period. This extension of the model is feasible, although it introduces
heterogeneity among entrepreneurs.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have constructed a model to evaluate the hypothesis that shocks to equity market
liquidity are an independent source of the business cycle. The model is easy for aggregation and
for the construction of the recursive competitive equilibrium. After calibrating the model to the
US data, I have computed the dynamic response of the equilibrium to shocks. A negative liquidity
shock in the equity market can generate large drops in investment and output but, contrary to
what one may conjecture, the shock generates an equity price boom. This response of equity price
occurs as long as a negative liquidity shock tightens ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints on investment.
For equity price to fall as it typically does in a recession, the negative liquidity shock must be
accompanied or caused by other shocks that reduce the need for investment suﬃciently and relax
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints on investment. I have discussed some candidates of these concurrent
shocks. In particular, I have illustrated that if the negative liquidity shock is accompanied by a
strong negative productivity shock, then the dynamics of major macro variables and asset prices
in the model are similar to the ones observed in a recession.
The main message that should be taken from this analysis is not that shocks to equity market
liquidity are not important for the business cycle but, rather, that such shocks are not the primary
driving force of the business cycle. In this paper, equity resaleability is taken exogenously as
is in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). It is plausible that equity resaleability is aﬀected by other
components of the economy. For example, negative shocks to productivity or the quality of
capital may increase the diﬃculty to re-sell equity. If this is the case, then ﬂuctuations in equity
resaleability can amplify or propagate the business cycle. Even if productivity shocks are the
primary driving force of the business cycle, pro-cyclical ﬂuctuations in equity resaleability seem
technology as such that one unit of capital needs 1/κ units of investment. A higher κ represents a higher quality of
investment. However, a fall in κ may not necessarily reduce equity price. To see this, note that the introduction of





e. For any given λ
e,af a l li nκ reduces the
marginal beneﬁt, and increases the marginal cost, of issuing equity to ﬁnance investment. This eﬀect exacerbates
the problem, unless λ
e falls suﬃciently.
25necessary for generating the observed negative correlation between equity price and the price of
liquid assets. Moreover, the diﬃculty in re-selling equity seems a potent friction that generates the
equity premium. Nevertheless, this paper does illustrate in a concrete way that various policies
which have been implemented to increase asset market liquidity during a recession might have
missed the primary source of the recession, although they might have helped reducing the extent
of the recession.
This analysis suggests that it is important to explicitly model why asset market liquidity
ﬂuctuates. Also, as discussed in the introduction, I have abstracted from ﬁnancial intermediation
and debt-ﬁnancing in order to focus on the evaluation of the Kiyotaki-Moore hypothesis. It is
useful to build an integrated model to incorporate frictions in both the equity market and ﬁnancial
intermediation. In particular, if ﬁrms can use the existing equity as collateral in borrowing from
ﬁnancial intermediaries, then a negative shock to equity resaleability reduces a ﬁrms’ net worth,
which can lead to lower investment and the ampliﬁcation of the business cycle. The model in this
paper is promising for this integration because its structure facilitates aggregation.
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A. The Mapping T on Asset Price Functions
To construct the mapping T on asset price functions, start with arbitrary functions q,pb ∈ C1.
The following procedure constructs the updated asset price functions Tq and Tpb:
(i) Substitute the factor market clearing conditions (2.18) and (2.19) into requirement (ii) of the
equilibrium deﬁnition. This step generates r and w as functions of ( ,K,Z).
(ii) Substitute the functions for (r,w) in step (i) and the market clearing conditions (2.18) - (2.21)
into the household’s optimality conditions (2.10) - (2.13). Then, solve (i,ce,c w,c,λ e) as functions
of ( ,K,Z).
(iii) Substitute the resulting functions in steps (i) and (ii) above into the goods market clearing
condition, (2.17), and solve   as a function of (K,Z). With this function  (K,Z), the functions
solved in steps (i) and (ii) express (r,w)a n d( i,ce,c w,c,λ e)a sf u n c t i o n so f( K,Z). Similarly,
(r+1,w +1)a n d(  ,i,ce,c w,c,λ e)+1 can be expressed as functions of (K+1,Z +1).
(iv) Substitute the functions obtained in step (iii) and the law of motion of aggregate capital
in requirement (iv) of the equilibrium deﬁnition into the right-hand sides of the asset pricing
equations (2.14) and (2.15). The result is a pair of functions of (K,Z), provided that Z follows
a Markov process. These are the updated asset price functions, denoted as T(q,pb)(K,Z).
It can be veriﬁed that for any q,pb ∈ C1, Tq and Tpb are continuous functions of (K,Z)a n d
their values lie in R+.T h a ti s ,T maps a pair of elements in C1 back into C1,w h e r eC1 is the set
containing all continuous functions mapping K×Zinto R+.Aﬁxed point of T is a pair of asset
price functions in the equilibrium. After obtaining the ﬁxed point of asset pricing functions, I
can retrieve the policy functions of individuals’ decisions and other variables.
B. Identifying Parameters and Computing Dynamics
Let me ﬁrst describe how to identify the parameters. The values of β, ρ, A∗, δA, δφ and π are
exogenously set and the explanations for these values are given in the text. The parameter η
is calculated from the elasticity of labor supply, 1
η−1 = 1, and the capital share in output is
α =0 .36. Since aggregate investment in the steady state is πi∗ =( 1− σ)K∗, the ratio of annual
investment to capital is 4πi∗/K∗ =4 ( 1− σ). Equating this to the target, 0.076, yields σ.
Setting total hours of work to the target yields (1−π) ∗ =0 .25. Given π,t h i ss o l v e s ∗. Setting
the ratio of capital to annual output in the steady state to the target yields K∗/(4A∗F∗)=3 .32.
With the value of α identiﬁed above, this condition solves r∗.S i n c er∗ = A∗F0
1,Ic a ns o l v eK∗
27and recover i∗ =( 1− σ)K∗/π.A l s o , w∗ = A∗F0
2.T h e s e v a l u e s o f (  ∗,K∗,i ∗,r∗,w∗) will be
used to identify some parameters below. Since the ratio of government spending to output is
g/(A∗F∗)=0 .18, I can solve g.
Setting the annualized net rate of return to liquid assets, I have 1/(p∗
b)4 − 1=0 .02. This
solves for p∗
b. Substituting this value of p∗
b into the asset pricing equations in the steady state,
(2.25) and (2.26), using the value of r∗ identiﬁed above, and using θ = φ∗,Ic a ns o l v eφ∗, θ and
q∗. Using the target on the share of liquid assets, I have p∗
bB/(p∗
bB + q∗K∗)=0 .12. Because p∗
b,
q∗ and K∗ are all solved by now, this condition solves B.
There are two parameters still to be solved, (u0,h 0). To identify them, I substitute the
values of (r∗,q∗,φ ∗,K∗,i ∗,B,g) into the steady-state version of (2.10) to solve ce∗. The goods-
market clearing condition yields c∗ = A∗F∗ − πi∗ − g.T h e n , t h e d e ﬁnition of c yields cw∗ =
(c∗ − πce∗)/(1 − π). Substituting the values of (cw∗,  ∗,w∗) into the steady-state version of the
ﬁrst-order condition of labor supply, (2.11), I obtain the value of h0.N o t et h a ti∗ > 0. Combining
the steady-state versions of (2.12) and (2.13) to eliminate λe∗, I obtain an equation in which u0
is the only item still to be solved. Solve this equation for u0.
Now let me describe how to compute the dynamics of the equilibrium after some shocks.
Suppose that there are shocks to A or φ or both. Let me focus on various cases where the new
paths of A and φ are completely known after the shocks are realized at the beginning of time
t = 1, because only such cases are examined in the text. An example is a one-time shock to A or φ
or both that occurs at t = 1, after which A and φ follow (3.1) and (3.2) with the error terms being
zero for all t ≥ 2. Another example is a change to the path of A or φ or both that becomes known
at t =1 .W i t hs u c hs h o c k s ,t h ee n t i r ep a t ho fZ =( A,φ) becomes known immediately after the
beginning of t = 1. Given this path of Z, I can use the equilibrium asset price functions and
the policy functions to compute the paths of equilibrium variables. Speciﬁcally, at t =1 ,a s s e t
prices are q1 = q(K1,Z 1)a n dpb,1 = pb(K1,Z 1), where K1 is predetermined and Z1 is known. An
individual household’s optimal decisions in period 1 are given by x1 = x(K1,B;K1,Z 1), where
x is the policy function for any variable in the list (c,i,ce,s e
+1, ,c w,s +1,b +1). Similarly, I can
compute factor prices (w1,r 1) and aggregate variables in period 1. Using (2.22), I can obtain K2.
With (K2,Z 2), I repeat the process to obtain all equilibrium variables in period 2. Continuing
this process yields the dynamic path of the equilibrium after the shocks.
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